In this paper we investigate the economic rationales for the design of health care financing schemes. We make an explicit distinction between the arguments for governments to implement a system of mandatory cross-subsidies to achieve affordability in the financial access to basic services for high-risk or low-income individuals, and the arguments to mandate the coverage for predefined health care services. 
Introduction
In most countries governments decide about the introduction of mandatory coverage and mandatory cross-subsidies on the basis of a number of underlying arguments.
These arguments can be manifold eg. ethical, historical (ie. path dependency), political (ie. pressure groups), economic etc. In this paper, the focus is on the set of economic rationales for the design of health care financing schemes. For this purpose, a general framework is developed that analyses the main economic rationales underlying the political choice of enforcing a system of mandatory cross-subsidies and introducing a mandatory coverage provision. In particular, the following questions are addressed:
• What can be the economic arguments for governments to enforce a system of mandatory cross-subsidies and to implement a legal mandate to purchase coverage for a set of predefined services? This paper is organized as follows. In the next sections, we make a distinction between a system of mandatory cross-subsidies (section (2.2.)), imposed to achieve affordability in the financial access to basic services, and mandatory coverage (section (2.3.)) introduced to guarantee that certain groups of individuals are covered and protected against the financial risk of needing certain medical services. This distinction is based on the divergence between the arguments for the enforcement of a system of mandatory crosssubsidies and the arguments to mandate the coverage for predefined health care services. The main implications for the design of health care financing schemes are summarised (section 2.4.).
Mandatory cross-subsidies
Although universal mandatory coverage for a uniform set of services may guarantee an affordable access to care, it may not be a necessary and proportionate tool from an economic perspective. In order to achieve an affordable access to basic health care services for vulnerable groups (eg. low-income or high-risks individuals), it is sufficient for governments to introduce a system of cross-subsidies, in which low-risk and/or high-income individuals contribute to the financing of health care services needed by high-risk and/or low-income individuals. Although in most societies individuals appear to be willing to support such a system of cross-subsidies, government intervention may be required in order to assure its existence and functioning. In particular, if the contributions are not given voluntarily (eg. by external donors)
governments may have to impose a system of mandatory income-or risk-related crosssubsidies. The broader the minimum set of health services considered as basic, 2 the higher are the mandatory cross-subsidies' contributions.
In the following subsections, we discern the main economic arguments related to the enforcement of a system of mandatory cross-subsidies that aims at achieving an affordable financial access to health care services for the high risks and/or the low income groups. In particular, we distinguish and discuss the following economic arguments: the presence of externalities in the demand for some health care services (section 2.2.1.), the individual's risk of becoming a high risk (section 2.2.2.), and the moral hazard effect induced by cross-subsidisation (section 2.2.3.).
Externalities
For some goods and services, including many forms of medical treatment, consumers may be willing to pay for the consumption by others. A reason for this is that the consumption of health care services produces external effects. Externalities arise when a consumption (production) activity of one set of individuals affects the utility functions of other individuals, while this effect is not included in the individuals' utility functions (Rosen, 2005) . Externalities can be both positive and negative. Positive (negative) externalities occur when actions of one set of individuals make other individuals better (worse) off, yet the first set neither bear the costs nor receive the benefits of doing so (Gruber, 2005) . 2 Basic services are the totality of cross-subsidised services.
The external effects generated by an individual's (non-) consumption of health care services' are mainly the consequence of two types of interpersonal preferences: altruistic and egoistic preferences. The literature tracks down a third type of interpersonal preferences so-called paternalistic preferences (Culyer & Simpson, 1980; van Doorslaer & Schut, 1999) . Since the only difference between paternalistic and altruistic preferences is in the extent and the focus of an individual's concern about others, we simply distinguish between two types of altruistic preferences. We refer to type-1 altruistic preferences if an individual's concern is about others' general wellbeing and to type-2 altruistic preferences if an individual concerns specifically about others' health status.
Altruistic preferences
A first important consumption externality in health care is the presence of type-1 altruistic preferences that is an individual's concern about the wellbeing of others. Thus, an individual's concern about others' well being generates an altruistic externality that calls for subsidisation. Type-1 altruistic preferences may undertake a very general form of interpersonal dependencies. For instance, the interpersonal utility function for individual B may look like the following:
The utility of B is in this case a direct function of the utility of individual A and therefore of A's health status (H A ) and non-medical consumption (C A ). An important implication of this model is that B respects the preferences of A. For example, if A prefers other goods (C A ) over health or health care, than B may also be willing to pay for A's consumption of these other goods (C A ). Therefore, A freely chooses, based on his/her own preferences, whether to consume medical care (M A ) or other goods (C A ). A financial transfer of income (lump sum) from B to A would appear to be the simplest transaction in order to increase A's utility. 3 Alternatively, an individual's concern about others may not be focused on others' general wellbeing but specifically on their health status (type-2 altruistic preferences). In other words, an individual may prefer to contribute to improvements in others' health status rather than others' general welfare (Arrow, 1963; Reinhardt, 1998) . In this case, type-2 altruistic preferences may be expressed by the following interpersonal utility function for individual B:
The utility of B is a direct function of A's health status (H A ), therefore B's willingness to subsidise limits itself to A's medical consumption, in so far that it positively contributes to A's health status. Possible interpersonal transactions, which could increase the utilities of both individuals, would have to be income-or risk-related subsidies earmarked to the consumption of specific services that positively contribute to health.
Most people seem to be unwilling to deny effective care to other members of society. 4 Presumably, an individual's concern toward others' health status does not only depend on the effectiveness of treatments, but also on the costs and the severity of the illness.
For instance, in case of lifesaving interventions individuals may be willing to crosssubsidise the financial access of high-risk or low-income individuals to services or treatments, even if they are not particularly cost-effective. Thus, altruistic preferences may be stronger for some health care services than for others. 3 The problem with this "lump-sum solution" is the virtual impossibility of establishing lump-sum taxes and subsidies that do not affect incentives of either the payer of the tax or the recipient of the subsidy (Graff, 1971; Nath, 1969; Samuelson, 1947) . 4 Van den Berg et al. (1986) found evidence of the presence of strong altruistic preferences for medical care consumption in the Netherlands. From data of the 1985 Health Interview Survey by the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) they conclude that 78% of the representative sample population fully disagreed with the statement that 'people with a less favourable health status should pay more for health care than people in good health' (9% partially agreed, only 3% fully agreed and 10% had no opinion).
Given the presence of altruistic preferences, an individual's utility of supporting a system of cross-subsidies may depend on various factors, such as the cost-effectiveness of services, the initial health status of the beneficiary, the expected cost of services per consumer, and the consumers' responsibility for the incidence of the disease. Each of these factors will be discussed below.
Cost-effectiveness of services
Cost-effectiveness analyses (CEA) are usually indicated as the primary tools policymakers adopt in deciding whether to include (or exclude) a service in the basket (Drummond et al., 1997) . The results of a CEA are summarised by the cost-effectiveness (CE) ratio. 5 The CE ratio compares the incremental cost of an intervention with the incremental health improvement attributable to the intervention. The health improvements of using the intervention are typically measured in quality-adjusted lifeyears (QALYs) gained. Therefore, the CE ratio is usually expressed as a cost per QALY gained. 6 The intervention with the relatively lower CE ratio is considered the most costeffective. In other words, CE ratios indicate which health care services will provide health improvements most efficiently (ie. at a lower cost) (Garber, 2000) .
The information provided by CE ratios may affect an individual's utility of contributing to a system of cross-subsidies, since they allow comparisons among different services in terms of costs and effects (ie. measured in QALYs). In particular, economically rational individuals with altruistic preferences maximise their utility by maximising the effect of cross-subsidies on others' health status. The effect of cross-subsidisation on others' health status increases with the cost-effectiveness of the treatment. The more cost- 5 Let the subscripts 1 and 0 denote the intervention under study and the alternative to which it is compared, respectively. If C 1 and C 0 are the net present values of costs that result when the intervention and alternatives are used, and E 1 and E 0 their respective health outcomes, the incremental CE ratio is simply: CE ratio = (C 1 -C 0 )/(E 1 -E 0 ). This ratio, which is a cost per unit incremental health effect, is often used as a measure of value. 6 In many respects QALYs are analogous to life expectancy, but include interventions that improve quality of life even when they do not affect survival. Each year that an individual lives longer contributes an additional year to the life expectancy calculation. The amount that each additional year of life adds to QALYs, in contrast, is a preference weight or utility that takes a value between 0 (death) and 1 (best health effective the services are the more effective cross-subsidisation on others' health status is, and thereby the more the altruistic preferences of rational individuals are satisfied.
All in all, the utility of a rational individual with altruistic preferences increases with the cost-effectiveness of health care services. The higher the cost-effectiveness of an intervention for a specified diagnosis, the higher an individual's utility of contributing to a system of cross-subsidies that guarantees the financial access to the intervention by others.
Initial health status of the beneficiary
Cost-effectiveness information is not the only grounds on which individuals' altruistic preferences are based, and thereby for governments to decide whether a certain service should be cross-subsidised. For instance, in the case of lung-or heart-transplants, a relatively high cost-effectiveness ratio does not appear to constitute a sufficient motivation to exclude these services from cross-subsidisation in most countries. A parallel argument can be made for Viagra, which is not included in the basic basket of most countries despite its low cost-effectiveness ratio.
Apparently, when it comes to assess whether and to what extent specific health care services generate altruistic externalities, other factors, besides cost-effectiveness, such as the individuals' initial health status have to be considered. 7 Our proposition is that an increase in an individual's utility produced by an improvement of a given size in others' health status is likely to be greater the lower the patient's initial health status (Figure 1 about here).
imaginable). 7 Although related to the argument of individuals' initial health status, the concepts of severity of illness (Nord et al., 1999) , fair inning (Williams, 1997) and proportional shortfall (Johannesson, 2001; Stolk, 2004) will not be discussed, since they do not explicitly refer to the variation in an individual's utility of supporting a system of cross-subsidies generated by an improvement in others' health status or quality of life.
From the "law of diminishing marginal return" it follows that an improvement on an individual's "own" health status increases his or her "own" utility more the lower his "own" health status. This is also likely to hold for the marginal utility of "other's"
health. The assumption of decreasing marginal utility of "other's" health implies that for equal improvements on A's health status (H A1 -H A0 = H' A1 -H' A0 ), the difference in B's utility decreases the higher is A's initial health status (U' B1 -U' B0 < U B1 -U B0 ). More precisely:
Therefore, the plausible assumption of decreasing marginal utility of "other's" health implies that an individual's marginal utility of supporting a system of cross-subsidies that guarantees the financial access to specific services is greater the lower others' initial health status. Everything equal, the poorer the initial health status (measured in QALYs) of a patient, the more the effect of cross-subsidies is satisfying an individual's altruistic preferences.
In current CEA, health improvements (ie. gains in QALYs) produced by consumption of health care services are weighed equally regardless the initial health status of patients.
Thus, only the number of QALYs gained determines priority, while in a decisionmaking process of a rational altruistic individual QALYs that are gained by people with a lower initial health status may be given more weight. For instance, patients eligible for a lung transplant normally are in such poor health states (in Figure 1 closer to 0 on the X axis, ie. H A0 ), which altruistic individuals may find it acceptable to cross-subsidise the high cost per QALY in order to provide patients with a 'last resort medicine'. This phenomenon may be especially pronounced for lifesaving interventions. In contrast, erectile dysfunction is generally considered to be a minor health problem. Since it generally occurs to people with good health status (in Figure 1 H' A0 , ie. high initial health status), the QALY gains produced by Viagra, which is a cost-effective treatment, would receive a relatively low weight. 8 In deciding whether (and for which diagnoses)
the financial access to a service should be cross-subsidised, weights that consider the cost-effectiveness of services and the initial health status of patients could be used to reflect the individuals' altruistic preferences.
The expected cost of services per consumer
A rational and altruistic individual's utility of supporting a system of cross-subsidies may also be affected by the expected costs of health care services faced by others. All other things equal, the lower the expected cost of services per consumer the weaker the effect of cross-subsidies is likely to be in satisfying individuals altruistic preferences. In general, a system of cross-subsidies particularly satisfies altruistic preferences, and thereby it produces a welfare gain, if it increases financial access to otherwise unaffordable care (Nyman, 2003) . Whether and to what extent health care is unaffordable may vary across individuals, and it depends in particular on their available income (or total wealth). For instance, if services involve low utilisation rate and are relatively cheap (ie. Paracetamol), an individual may not be willing to crosssubsidise people who need them, given that these services may be easily accessed without constituting an excessive financial burden on each consumer. Nevertheless, there always are individual consumers for whom even low prices or volumes are hard to afford, and the absence of subsidies may cause differences in health care use. These differences may generate altruistic externalities for some health care services used by some individuals, and thus call for subsidies.
Ceteris paribus, the higher the expected price and volume of medical care per consumer, the greater an individual's utility of contributing to a system of cross-subsidies, and thereby the stronger governments' arguments to enforce it.
Consumer's responsibility for the incidence of the disease
Another factor that may influence an individual's willingness to support a system of cross-subsidies can be derived from a consumer's responsibility in originating the condition for which services are demanded. Consider the case of health care
expenditures that are clearly caused by the individuals' behaviour, such as smoking or skiing accidents. All in all, the greater a consumer's responsibility in originating a condition is, the less would the use of services satisfy altruistic preferences, and thereby the lower an individual's utility to support cross-subsidisation for the consumption of the services. In practice, however, it may be difficult to establish a clear connection between someone's responsibility and health care consumption. And, even if so, it may be practically unfeasible to set-up a system of cross-subsidies that corrects for it.
Egoistic preferences
Externalities generated by the individual's (non-) consumption of health care services may also be the consequence of egoistic preferences. For instance, individual B may be concerned about the use of medical care by individual A simply for egoistic reasons such as in the case of communicable diseases. The interpersonal utility functions for B looks like the following:
The medical consumption of A (M A ), for example in the form of vaccination, reduces the chances that A gets a communicable disease and improves, in that way, the health of A (H A ). However, because of the existence of a chance that B will also be infected by A (external effect), this has an influence on the (expected) health of B (H B ), and thereby on B's utility U B . In general, immunisation for communicable diseases yields a positive utility for all non-immunised individuals. This externality limits itself to the use of few health care services, for which there is a divergence between collective and individual benefits or costs of consumption (Schut and Lapre', 1988; Schut, 1995) . Suppose that the full cost of immunisation is borne by each consumer then the risk of underconsumption is likely to occur, that is individuals may purchase less of these services than the socially optimal level. In fact, rational consumers would purchase goods until the ratio of the marginal utility of each to its price is equal across all goods. Therefore, when there is a positive consumption externality, the collective marginal utility is greater than that of the individual, so that (some) consumers, acting on their own and relying on their own resources, will not buy a large enough quantity of such goods (Rice, 2003) . The risk of underconsumption is higher for low-income individuals, because high-income people have higher opportunity costs of sickness (higher time price) and lower marginal utility of money. In the case of a positive externality, a straightforward way to overcome underconsumption is to introduce subsidies. 9 If a large number of people benefits from the subsidies, as it appears to be the case for immunisations, it is very likely that most individuals would also be willing to participate in a system of cross-subsidies.
Another consumption externality in health care is the presence of individuals' concern about their own treatment opportunities relative to others. Therefore, individuals' utility depends not so much on what care they have access to in absolute terms but relative to others (Rice, 2003) . Most plausible, perhaps, would be that people want those who have less access than they have to have more (altruistic preferences) and, at the same time, want to have as much access to services as those who have more (concern about status or rank). Although economists usually assume that utility is a function of an individual's endowment, independent of his relative position, the importance of relative standing, or positional externalities, has a long history in economic theoretical (Veblen, 1899; Duesenberry, 1949; Galbraith, 1958 ) and empirical analysis (Duncan, 1976; Kapteyn et al., 1985; Neumark, 1993; Easterlin, 1995) . Positional 10 externalities occur when "one person's action alters an important frame of reference for others' " (Frank, 1991) . People care about their relative position in society for many reasons. One of these reasons might be that people feel envy when others have things that they themselves do not possess. Envy may change individuals' utility functions and its presence raises important policy questions (Frank, 1985; Bannerjee, 1990; Elster, 1991; Choi, 1993) . 11 For example, the use of cosmetic treatments such as facelifts by some individuals may result in a reduction of the utility for the others since their look may be no longer as appealing.
Then society's marginal utility from the consumption of cosmetic treatments will be lower than the individual marginal utility of the facelifts' users. Society's marginal utility may be realigned with the marginal utility of individuals consuming cosmetic services either by introducing cross-subsidies or taxation. A system of cross-subsidies may be introduced with the purpose of increasing the financial accessibility to cosmetic care for those individuals who are willing but not able to pay for it. Moreover, the 10 The term 'positional' has not been applied uniformly in the literature. For instance, positional goods were initially defined by Hirsch (1976) as those that are in fixed supply or subject to congestion with increased use.
11 Solnick et al. (1998) attempt to identify what things create positional externalities and when people may find themselves on a positional treadmill. In other words, they try to answer the question: to what extent is positional externalities imposed when I have eg. cosmetic surgery? They found that positional concerns are extremely important for physical attractiveness and stronger for goods than for bads.
concern for great relative physical attractiveness can lead everyone to expand resources simply to remain in the same relative position (Wolf, 1991) . On the other hand, crosssubsidising cosmetic surgery (or similar services) lowers the costs borne by individuals, and thereby it may increase the quantity of services consumed (ie. moral hazard) and the deadweight loss. In order to increase social welfare and correct for this moral hazard, governments could introduce taxation on the consumption of these services or leave these benefits out of the basic basket (Frank, 1999) . So, to the extent that positional externalities are present in the consumption of health care services the introduction of cross-subsidisation leads to a trade-off between the satisfaction of this type of egoistic preferences, on the one hand, and moral hazard, on the other hand.
The financial risk of becoming a high risk
The individuals' risk of incurring high medical costs for future health problems may constitute a second main argument for governments to establish a system of crosssubsidies. In particular, the occurrence of catastrophic risks or chronic illnesses, such as AIDS, cancer, senile dementia, heart disease, or organ failure may cause dramatic increases in health expenditures, which are likely to be unbearable by most individuals.
The problem faced by consumers, in particular low-income individuals, is that of obtaining lifetime insurance for this type of risks/illnesses (Newhouse, 1984; Diamond, 1992; Pauly, 1992; Cochrane, 1995) . In a dynamic perspective, there is a missing market problem. If contracts covered the whole lifecycle, the individual probability of being sick in each period would be low, and premiums per-period would be low as well. However, insurance contracts are not signed once and for all, and individuals are exposed to the risk of incurring in events that increase their future expected expenditures. In this case, when the contract is renewed, insurers will adjust premiums to the new risk category, and access to coverage may become problematic. This happens because in real-world markets insurance against the financial risk of becoming a high risk is incomplete.
Therefore, individuals lose welfare ex ante, since they want insurance against the risk of falling into a worse risk class but they cannot obtain it. More precisely, the welfare loss derives from a missing market for insurance against the chance of being discovered to be high risk. This problem has been termed the problem of renewable insurance or the problem of inter-temporal insurance (Cutler et al., 2000) .
In order to correct for this market failure, government intervention may be required. 12 In particular, by establishing a system of cross-subsidies that increases the financial access for high-risk and/or low-income groups to health care services, governments guarantee that risk-averse consumers are insured against long-term health risks (ie. dramatic and unforeseen future changes in health status). In this sense a cross-subsidy system also provides insurance against the financial risk of becoming a high risk in the future (van de Ven et al., 2000).
Moral Hazard
Moral hazard may arise along several dimensions. In general, moral hazard problems refer to adverse behaviours encouraged by the guarantee of financial protection (ie.
subsidies) against losses caused by the occurrence of adverse events (Gruber, 2005) .
Since subsidies may reduce the marginal cost of health care services borne by the individual, they may result in excessive consumption of these services ('consumerinitiated moral hazard'). 13 Providers may also be inclined to induce additional demand for services of which they know that the costs are covered by subsidies ('supplierinduced moral hazard').
The problem of moral hazard or subsidies-induced overconsumption is not uniform across health care services. In particular, the extent to which cross-subsidies induce moral hazard depends on the service's demand price-elasticity and on the interactions between subsidised and non-subsidised services. The higher is a service's demand priceelasticity the greater is the subsidies-induced overconsumption. For instance, the moral 12 In theory, markets might develop to deal with the problem posed by lifetime insurance. For a careful review of the main reasons suggesting that market solutions (eg. long-term insurance, time-consistent insurance contracts) may be poor vehicles for insuring long-term health risks, we refer to Cutler et al., 2000. 13 Moreover, individuals may reduce preventive activities to protect health status if they are (to some extent) financially protected against adverse events.
hazard effect of cross-subsidising lung-transplants may be much smaller than that of cross-subsidising Viagra, because the demand price-elasticity of lung-transplants is likely to be smaller than Viagra's. Ceteris paribus, the smaller the moral hazard effect of cross-subsidising a specific service, the stronger may be the governments' arguments to enforce a system of cross-subsidies that guarantees the financial access to that service.
An important interaction between subsidised and non-subsidised services may occur if cheap substitutes (ie. OTC drugs) of subsidised services are not cross-subsidised.
Depending on the type of service, the choice of not subsidising relatively cheap substitutes may induce a substitution effect towards the remaining more expensive subsidised services. If the total cost (including the cross-subsidy) of services would exceed the cost of these substitutes, this substitution effect may imply a welfare loss for society. On the other hand, subsidising cheaper substitutes, which may be accessed by most individuals without excessive financial burden, may increase moral hazard. So, the substitution effect induced by a system of cross-subsidisation leads to a trade-off between cost-effective substitution and moral hazard.
All in all, cross-subsidisation may induce moral hazard problems, which consist of excessive, and thereby suboptimal, consumption of subsidised services. Moral hazard may also lead to health care cost inflation. 14 So, to the extent that a system of crosssubsidisation increases the incentives for excessive consumption of health care services, there is a trade-off between access to care and moral hazard. Therefore, when deciding whether to cross-subsidise specific services policymakers have to be aware of the financial consequences of subsidies-induced overconsumption.
14 In particular, subsidies-induced overconsumption, by increasing the costs of a specific service, may negatively affect the cost-effectiveness ratio of that service. In many countries (eg. France, The Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, etc.) policy-makers have in some circumstances taken into account the ex-post cost-effectiveness ratio in deciding whether or not to subsidise a service. For instance, cost-effective treatments with a high ex-post cost-effective ratio (eg. selective serotonin reuptake (SSRIs), sildenafil (Viagra) ect.) were (partially) removed from the basic basket. On the other end, treatments not considered cost-effective ex-ante (eg. ultra-orphan drugs) were subsidised because of their low ex-post impact on the budget available for cross-subsidies ( 
Mandatory coverage
Coverage, that provides financial access to predefined health care services, may be particularly beneficial for those at the lower end of the income distribution (Nyman, 2003) . However, it is those at the lower end of the income distribution who are most likely not to take out coverage voluntarily (Feldstein, 1999 
Free riding
The first alleged argument to enforce mandatory coverage is free riding. People may have incentives to hide their true preferences for some goods or services (eg. public or merit goods) and let other people pay while enjoying the benefits themselves. This phenomenon is known as free riding and its presence may lead to inefficient allocations of resources. In general, any investment in goods or services that has a personal cost but 15 In the literature, adverse selection is often advocated as another argument for governments to introduce mandatory coverage (Nyman, 2003) . The government can avoid the adverse selection induced welfare loss from inadequate protection by making coverage compulsory. In the presence of mandatory coverage low-risk individuals are prevented from opting out of a pooling equilibrium. But compulsion may generate other welfare losses, ie. moral hazard. Alternative and less invasive measures can deal with adverse selection while maintaining adequate risk protection for all risk groups. The central idea is to require insurers to offer adequate coverage to all applicants, irrespective of risk, while keeping premiums affordable by means of some system to redistribute purchasing power for medical care (Schut, 1995) . For instance, governments may introduce a system of (risk-related) cross-subsidies financed via mandatory solidarity contributions that may increase the affordability and sustainability of coverage for high risks.
a common benefit may provide incentives for individuals to underinvest, or to invest less than is socially optimal (free rider problem) (Gruber, 2005) .
In the context of health care financing, free riders are individuals who purposely do not purchase coverage for their own health care entitlements because they expect not to be denied access to medical treatments in case of need or others in society are willing to pay for them if they really need health care. Empirical studies show that the presence of last resort safety nets, such as charity, reduces the demand for coverage, because they remove the health and the financial consequences (ie. disutility) of being uncovered For services or treatments with very high average expected costs (eg. liver failure requiring a liver transplant or routine dialysis, diabetes, asthma, or other chronic diseases that would require periodic physician visits and regular use of pharmaceuticals etc.) mandatory coverage may be necessary to prevent free riding even for high income groups, excluding those individuals belonging to the high end of that distribution. For those at the very low end of the income distribution, the coverage of (most) health care services, including those with a low average expected cost, would represent a relatively high financial burden, and thereby increase the incentives and the opportunities for free riding. Therefore, for low-income groups a mandatory coverage provision for a broad set of services may be necessary to prevent free riding and thereby increase welfare. For middle/high income groups mandatory coverage may be limited to services with high average expected costs.
Ceteris paribus, the effectiveness of a mandatory coverage provision to prevent individuals from free riding, and thereby to increase welfare, diminishes as the average expected costs of care decrease and increases as an individual's available income decreases.
Lack of foresight
Governments may also enforce mandatory coverage in the presence of individuals' Individuals' lack of foresight is not homogeneous across income groups and types of health risks. Firstly, different income groups may have heterogeneous preferences towards health care coverage, since the marginal value of money is different across income groups. An important difference between different income groups is that particularly for those at the low end of the distribution the voluntary purchase of coverage represents a loss of income that would otherwise be used to purchase necessities, like shelter, food and clothing. Thus, at the low end of the income distribution, the utility cost of purchasing coverage is greater vis à vis the value of the other goods and services forgone, compared to those at the high range of the distribution. Forgoing these necessities could have consequences for health similar to those of forgoing medical care when ill (Nyman, 2003) . Another important difference across income groups is that on average high-income individuals are better educated than low-income people and may afford high health care costs. Therefore, the lack of foresight argument for governments to introduce mandatory coverage is less relevant (although not irrelevant for catastrophic health risks) for high-income than for lowincome groups.
Secondly, myopic behaviour is not uniform across different types of health risks.
Individuals' forecasting ability may be weaker for health risks that may occur in a 'far future' than for health risks that may occur 'at any time'. In addition, individuals may not correctly appreciate how much certain health care services may contribute to their own health or for the health status of their dependents in the future. We refer, for example, to psycho-geriatric care, to long-term psychiatric care, to the use of dental care by children, to the contraceptive pill for girls under 18 years old, to obstetric care, to long-term nursing home care and to care for persons addicted to alcohol and drugs (van de Ven, 1995). A theoretical explanation to this phenomenon is that individuals' aversion toward risk is not symmetric, since they appear to prefer certain to uncertain gains but prefer uncertain to certain losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) . Therefore, the stronger the individual's asymmetry with respect to uncertainty, the less likely the person will voluntarily demand for insurance coverage. Moreover, the more catastrophic health risks are, the greater the impact of an individual's lack of foresight may be on future health care expenditures, and thereby the stronger the rationale for governments to introduce a mandatory coverage provision. For other types of health risks, variations in an individual's available income may affect his or her willingness to voluntary demand for coverage. Low-income people are more exposed to the financial consequences of shortsightedness than high-income groups, due to a relatively lower ability to pay. A mandatory coverage provision for a broad set of services, including those with low future costs, may be necessary for low income groups to prevent (the consequences of) myopic behaviour and thereby increase welfare. Extending the mandatory coverage provision for non-catastrophic risks to high-income groups may not be necessary to prevent that high income groups behave myopically.
Ceteris paribus, the more serious health risks are, the greater the impact of individuals' lack of foresight may be on health expenditures, and thereby the stronger the rationale for governments to introduce a mandatory coverage provision.
Transaction costs of organising otherwise a system of cross-subsidies
A third economic rationale to introduce mandatory coverage can be the transaction costs of organising otherwise a system of mandatory cross-subsidies. If without universal mandatory coverage these costs are much higher than with universal mandatory coverage, governments may make the coverage for cross-subsidised services mandatory for everyone (ie. including high-income people). On the other hand, universal mandatory coverage may induce moral hazard and increase total health care costs, and thereby constitute a welfare loss for society as a whole. So to the extent that the organisation of an alternative system of cross-subsidies generates high transaction costs, Society may face a trade-off between moral hazard and transaction costs of organising cross-subsidies.
Conclusion
The introduction of mandatory coverage may be an effective welfare increasing provision so far as it prevents free riding and myopic behaviour. However, these economic arguments are not equally relevant for different groups of individuals and for different types of services or health risks. Therefore, the introduction of universal mandatory coverage for a uniform comprehensive package of services (eg. including the coverage of services with low average expected costs) may be unnecessary to prevent free riding and lack of foresight. Universal mandatory coverage for a uniform set of services may also be disproportionate because it may reduce the responsiveness to consumers' preferences, induce moral hazard and increase total health care costs, and thereby constitute a welfare loss for society.
Fine-tuning mandatory coverage
In order to avoid the welfare decreasing consequences of moral hazard, mandatory coverage could be fine-tuned according to the individuals' available income and the type of service. An important precondition for fine-tuning mandatory coverage to different income groups is to maintain the desired level of cross-subsidies between risk groups. Therefore, the fine-tuning of mandatory coverage should be accompanied with a (not too costly) system of cross-subsidies between risk-groups.
The fine-tuning of mandatory coverage for different income groups may occur in two ways: by transferring in toto certain services from mandatory to voluntary coverage; or by increasing the extent of cost sharing (eg. deductibles). Hence, consumers may opt-out from mandatory coverage and voluntarily pay out-of-pocket (or seek for coverage) for certain services; or they may opt for a deductible, which means that they can choose to pay the costs up to a certain amount themselves. In both cases they receive a premium rebate.
High-income groups may be allowed to opt-out from mandatory coverage for a wider range of services (eg. GP, prescription drugs etc.) or to take a higher deductible than low-income groups, for which a mandatory coverage provision is necessary also for services with low average expected costs and for non-catastrophic health risks.
Therefore, fine-tuning mandatory coverage according to the individuals' available income and to the type of service effectively prevents free riding and myopic behaviour, and it also reduces moral hazard and thereby increases welfare compared to universal mandatory health insurance for a uniform set of services, provided that organising crosssubsidies is not too costly.
The drawback of fine-tuning mandatory coverage is that it may imply high transaction costs. In particular, the more mandatory coverage is fine-tuned to the individuals' available income the higher are the consumers' search costs and the transaction costs of fine-tuning involved in the definition of the several mandatory packages of services, in adjusting the packages to variations in individuals' incomes (eg. due to changes in employment status, promotion etc.) or to health care services' technological innovations.
So, the fine-tuning of mandatory coverage by type of service and income groups confronts governments with a trade-off between moral hazard, on the one hand, and the transaction costs of fine-tuning coverage and organising cross-subsidies, on the other hand. In the next subsections we discuss two options that aim at smoothing this tradeoff by limiting the extent to which mandatory coverage can be fine-tuned: the two-plan option (section 2.3.2.1.) and the option of a single-plan with income-related deductibles (section 2.3.2.2.). Both options may be relevant for both NHS-countries and for countries for a competitive (social) health insurance market.
High and low option plans
Governments may make a clear distinction between two plans, a low-option plan for the high-income groups and a high-option plan for the low-income groups, rather than having a large variety of mandatory packages of services fine-tuned according to the individuals' income.
The low-option plan primarily includes health care services with high expected costs for which mandatory coverage is necessary also for high-income groups (eg. to prevent myopic behaviour). The high-option plan envisages a mandatory coverage provision for a comprehensive package of services (eg. including low-cost care) for low-income groups. By choosing the low-option plan (high-income) individuals may reduce the mandatory package and benefit from a reduction of the mandatory contribution (ie. premium rebate). In order to guarantee an affordable access to the (broader) high-option plan for high-risk or low-income individuals, the premium rebate should not affect the viability of the system of mandatory cross-subsidies. 16 In case of an unregulated 16 Although in theory the arguments for mandatory coverage differ from the arguments for mandatory cross-subsidies, in most countries the package of cross-subsidised services coincides with, or contains, the competitive health insurance market the premium reduction should be risk-rated. In other words, the premium rebate for the low-option plan is higher for the high-risk individuals than for the low-risk individuals. If the difference in contribution per risk group between the two plans would reflect the difference in expected costs of the two plans per risk group, then cross-subsidies are maintained. Moreover, if the premium rebate does not affect the system of cross-subsidies, the financial access to the highoption plan for the high-risk or low-income people is subsidised by the low-risk or highincome individuals. In addition to the high-option there might be all kind of voluntary supplementary health insurance, ie. not-subsidized.
Compared with allowing consumers to choose from several levels of mandatory coverage, the distinction between a high-option and a low-option plan is more effective in containing the consumers' search costs and the transaction costs of fine-tuning mandatory coverage. On the other hand, it is less responsive to consumers' preferences (ie. consumers' choice of coverage is limited to two plans) and also less effective in reducing moral hazard (but more effective than universal mandatory coverage).
Single-plan with income-related deductibles
An alternative to the two-plan option is to have mandatory coverage for a uniform package of services with the option for consumers to choose an income-related deductible with a premium rebate. On average, the higher the income the higher the maximum deductible level. The no-deductible plan can then be considered as the highoption plan and the high-deductible plan as the low-option plan. By taking a deductible, high-income individuals may reduce the mandatory package. The costs on which the mandatory cross-subsidies can be based on are the costs of the no-deductible plan (ie. high-option plan). The premium reduction in case consumers choose to take a package of services for which a mandatory coverage provision is enforced. For example, there are packages of cross-subsidised services for which there is no mandate to purchase coverage (eg. GP care for the high-income people in Ireland) but not vice versa. This is true for health care but not for other types of insurance (eg. car). In car insurance often the purchase of insurance is compulsory but not subsidised. Therefore, we plausibly assume that high-option plans coincide with the package of cross-subsidised services.
deductible could be unregulated and it would most likely be risk-rated in a competitive market, ie. a low premium reduction for low-risks and a high premium reduction for high-risk individuals. If the premium reduction is equal to the expected out of pocket expenditures (ie. it does not reduce the cross-subsidies) solidarity is maintained.
The single-plan option with voluntary income-related deductibles effectively prevents free riding and myopic behaviour; it avoids the transaction costs of fine-tuning mandatory coverage by type of service and income group and it enhances the responsiveness to consumers' preferences and it reduces moral hazard and total health care expenditures compared to universal mandatory health insurance for a uniform package of services.
Summary and conclusions
This paper investigates the economic rationales for the design of health care financing arrangements. It proposes a categorisation of financing schemes based on a distinction between mandatory cross-subsidies and mandatory coverage. The most important economic arguments for governments to enforce a system of mandatory cross-subsidies that guarantees the financial access to a predefined set of basic services to high-risk or low-income individuals are related to: the presence of externalities in health care services consumption; the individuals' risk of becoming bad risks; and the moral hazard effects induced by cross-subsidisation. Conversely, the rationales for mandatory coverage are based on considerations of free riding behaviour, individuals' lack of foresight and too high transaction costs of alternative ways to organise cross-subsidies.
The following summary tables 2a & 2b present an overview in which each economic argument is related to its positive or negative effect on the decision to organise crosssubsidies between risk/income groups and on the choice to enforce a mandatory coverage provision. 
Individual risk of becoming a bad risk (+)
Demand priceelasticity
(-)

Moral Hazard
Cheap substitutes (+) 
Cost of illness (+)
Income
(-) Lack of Foresight
Cost of illness (+)
Transaction costs of alternative ways to organise cross-subsidies (+)
From Table 2b we can also drawn the conclusion that the introduction of universal mandatory coverage for a uniform set of services is unnecessary to prevent free riding and myopic behaviour and also disproportionate because it induces moral hazard. In line with objective of preventing free riding and myopic behaviour, mandatory coverage could be fine-tuned according to the individuals' available income. In particular, the choice between enforcing universal mandatory coverage for a uniform package of basic services and fine-tuning mandatory coverage confronts governments with a trade-off between moral hazard, on the one hand, and the transaction costs of fine-tuning and of organising otherwise a system of mandatory cross-subsidies, on the other hand.
To smooth this trade-off, the following two options can be considered as pragmatic alternatives: the two-plan option and the option of a single-plan with voluntary incomerelated deductibles.
Although both options represent potentially attractive alternatives to universal mandatory coverage, the single-plan with the choice of income-related deductibles option is preferable on several grounds. Firstly, the distinction between two packages (ie. two-plan option) may result practically unfeasible, because it may generate difficulties in the identification of the criteria to find the services that clearly make the difference between the two packages. Secondly, under the two-plan option the transaction costs of fine-tuning are likely to be higher compared to the single-plan with income-related deductibles. Thirdly, the single-plan with voluntary income-related deductibles option provides a wider choice of plans than the two-plan option, and thereby it increases the responsiveness to consumers' preferences.
